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Introduction
The issue underlying the functioning of the European Union, in the achievement of its 
objectives and performance of tasks, is the observance of the legal principles that govern 
decision-making processes and common strategic objectives, and which are applicable 
when establishing European Union legislation and transposing it into national law1, 
including in the area of criminal law. One of these principles is the principle of propor-
tionality which, due to its complexity and significance for the processes of establishing 
and applying the law, requires detailed and separate discussion.
The concept of proportionality in the EU legal order
The principle of proportionality, which is one of the few principles expressed explicitly 
in the European Union acts,2 is widely applied in the EU legal order and is therefore one 
of the fundamental principles of the EU system3. Its formation proceeded on two planes: 
normative and case-law.
As regards the primary law of the European Union, the principle of proportionality 
acquired the status of a  treaty when the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force (see 
1 M. Witkowska, Zasady funkcjonowania Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2008, p. 178.
2 See Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU): “Under the principle 
of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties. The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of 
proportionality as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.”
3 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Rozwój zasady proporcjonalności w europejskim prawie wspólnoto-
wym, „Studia Europejskie” 2006, no. 1, p. 59; W. Szpringer, Subsydiarność jako zasada ustrojowa 
w państwie federalnym – członku Unii Europejskiej (na przykładzie RFN), in Subsydiarność, ed. 
D. Milczarek Warszawa 1998, p. 116.
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the then Article 3b § 3 of the Treaty), but it should be noted that its standardisation 
in Part I of the EC Treaty (“Principles”) means that it has been raised to the rank of 
a fundamental principle that underpins the legal and institutional order of the Euro-
pean Communities4. After the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, which did not 
introduce any substantial changes to this regulation, apart from revising the number-
ing of individual provisions, the normative basis for the functioning of the principle of 
proportionality was contained in Article 5(3) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC), providing that: “[any] action by the Community shall not go be-
yond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty,” detailing the criteria for 
applying this principle, as well as the practical issues related to its application, contained 
in ‘Protocol on the application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity’ at-
tached to the Treaty.5 
Applicable de lege lata, the Treaty of Lisbon contains many references to the principle of 
proportionality. It should be noted that in relation to the previous legal situation, it does not 
introduce any significant changes in this respect. The normative basis for the application 
of the principle is Article 5 of the new TEU (replacing Article 5 of the TEC), which pro-
vides in § 4: “under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. The institutions 
 of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the Protocol 
 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” Interpretation 
of this provision allows the assertion that the principle of proportionality has not funda-
mentally changed. The modifications introduced by this regulation are limited to a num-
ber of technical amendments, i.e.: the principle in question no longer concerns only the 
“Community action” (see Article 5 § 3 TEC), but extends to the “content and form of Un-
ion action”. Moreover, this general regulation includes a direct reference annexed to the 
Treaty and thus has the same legal force6 as the new7 ‘Protocol on the application of the 
4 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, op. cit., p. 66 and references therein.
5 It should be noted at the outset that the treaty wording of this principle, despite the extensive 
ECJ case law already in place at the time of adoption of the Treaty, takes account only of the 
requirement of necessity, omitting the justification of the measure in relation to the achieved 
objective and proportionality. With regard to the assessment of this fact, see ibidem, p. 68 and 
references therein.
6 D. Milczarek, Subsydiarność – próba bilansu, in Subsydiarność, op. cit., p. 327.
7 The Treaty of Lisbon provides that the existing Protocol on the application of the princi-
ples of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the EC Treaty, is repealed and replaced 
by a new protocol with the same title. What is new is the emphasis on the particular im-
portance of the European Commission, which, before submitting any proposal for a  legis-
lative act, has been committed to conduct wide-ranging consultations, taking into account, 
 in appropriate cases, the regional and local dimension of the actions carried out (Article 2 of 
the Protocol). In practice, this means that the Commission will have to take into account the 
principle of proportionality already at the preparatory stage, i.e. before the formal opening of 
the legislative process. Furthermore, the Protocol upholds the requirement to justify draft leg-
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principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’, which contains a set of rules, precise criteria 
 and the practical aspects concerning the application of these two principles,8 includ-
ing the provision that each institution, when exercising the powers conferred on it, 
shall ensure constant respect for the principle of proportionality, as defined in Article 5 
TEU. The ‘Protocol’ also lays down the requirement that each Community legislative act 
should state the reasons why the principle of proportionality was taken into considera-
tion at the time of its creation.
It is worth noting, however, that, contrary to the case-law of the ECJ, the general provi-
sions of the Treaty and the provisions of the Protocol only cover the European Union’s action 
and, in particular, the exercise of its powers, without taking into account the functions of 
the principle in question which relate to actions taken by Member States in the applica-
tion of EU law.9 It should be stressed, however, that the inclusion of this principle in the 
Treaties, followed by the indication in the Protocol of criteria allowing the EU institu-
tions to apply it precisely, is of constitutive significance and made it a Treaty principle 
of general scope, since until then it was applicable only in the field of soft law. Since 
the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, it has had priority over the secondary law 
applied by EU institutions, and moreover has had permanent status, since any change 
would require revision of the Treaty. This automatically gives the Court of Justice the 
power to verify the conformity of EU legislation with respect to this principle.10 
In conclusion, it can be assumed that the function of the principle of proportional-
ity is to control the manner in which the European Union exercises its powers, both in 
relation to Member States and individuals, and to assess the activities of those states. 
The overriding aim dictated by the desire to safeguard the interests of Member States 
and individuals is to prevent the EU from interfering in the freedom of those entities.11 
islative acts with respect to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5 of the 
Protocol), while extending this obligation to include in each justification a detailed statement 
making it possible to assess compliance with these principles. 
8 See § 2 of the preamble of the Protocol. It can therefore be concluded from the content of the 
Protocol that its provisions do not relate to the substance or scope of the principle in question, 
but merely contain procedural rules intended to facilitate its implementation. 
9 For more on this subject, see J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Sądowe stosowanie zasady pro- 
porcjonalności, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2009, no. 1, p. 11 et seq.
10 See, e.g., the ECJ rulings in the following cases: Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 44/70, p. 3727; 
Bela-Mühle v. Grows Farm, 114/76, p. 1211; The Queen, ex parte E.D. & F. Man (Sugar) Ltd v. 
Intervention Board for Agricultural, 181/84, p. 2889; The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food and Secretary of State for Health ex parte Fedesa and others, 331/88, p. 4023.
11 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Rozwój zasady..., op. cit., p. 66 and references therein; eadem, 
Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich, Toruń 2007, p. 252. For the sake of 
clarity, it is worth mentioning two important issues. Firstly, the substantial change introduced 
by the Treaty of Lisbon into Article 296 TFEU (ex Article 253 TEC) by adding the sen-
tence stating that “where the Treaties do not specify the type of act to be adopted, the institu-
tions shall select it on a case-by-case basis, in compliance with the applicable procedures and 
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It follows from the above, however, that neither the Treaty’s general legislation nor the 
Protocol include precise criteriafor the principle in question. Its determination should 
therefore be based on the ECJ case law.
In elaborating on the issue of the principle of proportionality in the case law of the 
European Court of Justice, it must be noted that, in terms of chronology, this princi-
ple appeared in European law (then: the Community) in the rulings of the European 
Court of Justice in the 1950s.12 Initially, however, it was not considered to be a general 
principle of law, and it only acquired the status of a principle for the overall assessment 
of the Community activities in an ECJ judgment of 1970, where the Court, speaking 
of it in the context of protection of fundamental rights, stated that “the freedom of 
action of individuals should not be limited beyond what is required for public interest 
purposes.”13 In practice, this meant introducing the requirement of proportionality to 
the Community’s interference in the rights of the individual.14 Under the successive 
judgements of the Court, the scope of this principle has been gradually extended to 
other manifestations of action taken by the Community institutions and, consequently, 
to the actions of Member States. In 1983, the Court in its subsequent ruling introduced 
a control mechanism for these actions in the light of the principle of proportionality, 
stating: “in order to determine whether a provision of Community law complies with the 
principle of proportionality, it must be determined, first, whether the measures which are 
envisaged for achieving the objective correspond to the significance of the objective, and 
secondly, whether they are necessary to achieve it.”15 It can be inferred form this word-
with the principle of proportionality.” Secondly, the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: ChFR EU), of which in the context of the applica-
tion of the principle of proportionality the provisions of Article 49 (principles of legality and 
proportionality of criminal offences and penalties), and Article 52 (scope of guaranteed rights) 
of the ChFR EU seem particularly important. 
12 See, e.g., the ECJ rulings in Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v. High Authority, 8/55, p. 292; 
Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v. High Authority, 15/57, p. 211. For more on this sub-
ject, see e.g. J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Sądowe..., op. cit., p. 60 et seq. 
13 See the ECJ ruling in Internationale Handelsgesselschaft GmBH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel, 11/70, p. 1125; M. Witkowska, op. cit., p. 178; A. Wyrozumska, Państwa 
członkowskie a Unia Europejska, in Prawo Unii Europejskiej. Zagadnienia systemowe. Prawo ma-
terialne i polityki, ed. J. Barcz, Warszawa 2006, p. 322.
14 Cf. J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Rozwój zasady..., op. cit., p. 61; A. Wyrozumska, op. cit., p. 322. 
See also J. Rivers, Proportionality and discretion in international and European law, in Trans-
national Constitutionalism. International and European Models, ed. N. Tsagourias, Cambridge 
2009, p. 110 et seq.
15 See the ECJ judgement in the case Fromançais S.A. v. Fonds d’orientation et de régularisation des 
marchés agricoles (FORMA), 66/82, p. 395. This mechanism was also applied in later judgements 
of the Court, see e.g. Office belge de l ’économie et de l ’agriculture (OBEA) v. SA Nicolas Corman et 
fils, 125/83, p. 3039; Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 116/82, p. 2519. For more on this 
issue, see J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Rozwój zasady..., op. cit., p. 62 et seq.
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ing that the principle of proportionality imposes certain restrictions on law-making and 
enforcing authorities. These constraints consist in requiring a certain balance between 
the scope and nature of the activities they undertake, and the intended purpose which 
they are to serve.16 In its rulings, therefore, the Court pointed out the need to use the 
proportionality test. It consists in analysing the compatibility of a given legal measure 
with the principle in question using a three-tiered mechanism: firstly, it must be stated 
that the measure is appropriate for achieving a given objective;17 then that it is necessary 
for its achievement,18 and that it is commensurate.19
The concept of proportionality therefore allows for two conclusions: the EU acts, and 
the actions taken on their basis, must be appropriate and necessary for achieving the 
objectives pursued by the regulation, and proportionate to the adverse consequences. On 
the other hand, if there are several appropriate measures, those that are the least invasive 
and burdensome for the Member States’ freedom of action must be chosen.20 
Thus, the principle of proportionality prohibits taking authoritative actions beyond 
necessity. The literature emphasizes that it serves both to assess the implementation 
of the provisions of EU law (i.e. legislative and administrative measures taken by the 
European institutions),21 as well as measures taken by Member States. In the latter case, 
it serves to check the compliance with the principle of proportionality of actions taken 
by Member States, or measures adopted by them, that either limit the rights and free-
doms arising from EU primary law, or concern the interpretation of EU law by national 
16 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Rozwój zasady..., op. cit., p. 63; A. Witkowska, op. cit., p. 178.
17 This criterion refers to the relationship between the measure used and the intended 
purpose, which must be justified in the light of Community law. The measure applied must 
be appropriate to achieve the objective, while the least possibly intrusive in the freedom of 
action of a Member State. For more on the subject, see J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Zasada 
proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich – kryteria i zakres kontroli dokonywanej przez 
Trybunał Sprawiedliwości, in Zasady ogólne prawa wspólnotowego, ed. C. Mik, Toruń 2007, p. 256 
et seq.
18 The measure used must be necessary for the particular situation, i.e. not going beyond what 
is necessary to achieve the objectives. It is therefore necessary to examine whether there is 
already a measure less intrusive to the freedom of action, e.g. less stringent provision. For more 
on the subject, see J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot 
Europejskich – kryteria..., op. cit., p. 258 et seq. These criteria were formulated by the ECJ in 
Schräder v. Hauptzollamt in Gronau, 265/87, p. 2237. See also the ECJ ruling in The Queen v. 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health ex parte Fedesa and 
others, 331/88, p. 4023; N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law, London – 
The Hague – Boston 1996, p. 191 et seq.
19 I.e. proportionate to the adverse effects or restrictions imposed on the individual. This is known 
as proportionality in the strict sense. For more on the topic, see J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, 
Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich – kryteria..., op. cit., p. 261 et seq.
20 Cf. the ECJ ruling in Schräder v. Hauptzollamt in Gronau, 265/87, p. 2237.
21 See J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Sądowe..., op. cit., p. 11 et seq.; eadem, Zasada proporcjonalności 
w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich, op. cit., p. 153 et seq.
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authorities when they apply it.22 This supervision may also relate to measures taken by 
Member States to implement EU law, as well as sanctions imposed by the authorities of 
the Member States for violation of this law, which are required to be effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive.23 At the same time, it should be emphasized that checking if na-
tional measures comply with the principle of proportionality may be carried out by both 
the ETS24 and – as a result of the ECJ decision – by national courts.25 However, some 
authors point out that the Court does not uniformly apply the principle in question, 
depending on the subject matter of the case, which may lead to the conclusion that it is 
a rather flexible means of judicial review, with the ECJ26 adopting substantially different 
standards for assessing the compatibility of legal acts with that principle.27
The principle of proportionality in the criminal law  
of the European Union
Although the principle of proportionality is one of the basic principles functioning in 
the national legal systems of the EU Member States,28 it is not often analysed in the 
context of European criminal law. This is primarily due to the disputed competence 
of the EU legislator with regard to establishing standards of criminal law.29 With the 
gradual extension of the European Union’s legitimacy to the area of criminal law, it is 
also becoming necessary to apply the basic norms and principles of EU law to this area. 
This section of the paper will therefore focus on discussing this aspect of the principle 
of proportionality. 
22 See, e.g., the ECJ rulings in Tanja Kreil v. Niemcy, 285/98, p. 66; Cassis de Dijon, 120/78, p. 649. 
For more on this subject, see A. Wyrozumska, op. cit., p. 324 et seq.
23 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Rozwój zasady..., op. cit. p. 62; eadem, Sądowe..., op. cit., p. 13 
et seq.; eadem, Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich, op. cit., pp. 164 et seq.; 
A. Wyrozumska, op. cit., p. 322 et seq.
24 E.g. in H. Franzén, 189/95, p. 5909.
25 E.g. in Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti, 67/98, p. 7289. On the assessment of the possibility 
of adoption of these two solutions, see J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Sądowe..., op. cit., p. 14 
et seq.
26 A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, Zasada proporcjonalności jako gwarancja swobód rynku wewnętrznego 
Wspólnoty Europejskiej, Warszawa 2009, p. 32 et seq.; J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Rozwój za- 
sady..., op. cit., p. 64 et seq.; eadem, Sądowe..., op. cit., p. 16 et seq.
27 For more on this topic, see A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, Podwójne zasady badania proporcjonalności 
przez Trybunał Sprawiedliwości, in Zasady ogólne..., op. cit., p. 271 et seq.
28 Cf., inter alia, Article 42 section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland; Article 103 
section 2 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz). 
29 In this issue cf., inter alia: J. Piskorski, Legitymizacja prawa karnego Unii Europejskiej, Poznań 
2013; M. Szwarc-Kuczer, Kompetencje Unii Europejskiej w dziedzinie harmonizacji prawa karnego 
materialnego, Warszawa 2011.
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The concepts of proportionality
As regards European criminal law, the concept of proportionality appears in many con-
texts. It can be found in the extensive ECJ case law discussed above, the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights (see. e.g. Article 49(3) ChFR EU), as well as many acts of the Commu-
nity’s secondary legislation, which often contain the wording whereby “sanctions (also: 
penalties or measures) [which] shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive”30 must be 
envisaged. This differentiation of the normative bases of the analysed principle allows us 
to conclude that proportionality in EU law is not a homogeneous notion. This view is 
also reflected in a doctrine in which two concepts of interpretation of this principle are 
distinguished.31
The first of these, known as retrospective proportionality, refers to the principle of 
proportionality in criminal law. Its essence is the assumption that the severity of the 
penalty must be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, thus indicating that 
it is derived from the guaranteed function of criminal law.32 With the retrospectiveness 
of proportionality, the basis for the penalty is the fact that the act was committed by 
the perpetrator in the past.33 Because this criminal approach to proportionality focuses 
on a certain degree of dependence between the the seriousness of the offence and the 
severity of the penalty imposed for committing it, it is desirable to formulate criteria on 
the basis of which which the required degree of correlation can be estimated. In criminal 
law, it is assumed that this function has two main components: the degree of fault of the 
perpetrator and the degree of social harm of the offence.34 
The second concept of proportionality relates to proportionality in the context of 
administrative law, which was broadly discussed in the first part of this study. In this 
context, the principle is expressed in the fact that all the measures taken (understood as 
regulations prohibiting specific conduct and providing specific sanctions for infringing 
30 See e.g. Article 58 § 1 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2015/849 
of 5 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing (Official Journal of the European Union of 5 June 2015, L 141 
et seq) or Article 2 § 1 of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities (Official Journal of 27 November 1995, C 316 p. 48 
et seq.).
31 See, e.g., P. Asp, Two notions of Proportionality, in Materials from the 22nd IVR Word Congress, 
p. 1, www.crimpol.eu/?p=200 [access: 12.02.2017]; N. Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort 
(Ultima Ratio), “Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law” 2004, no. 2, pp. 529, 532 et seq. 
32 With regard to the principle of proportionality in criminal law, see e.g. M. Królikowski, Spra- 
wiedliwość karania w  społeczeństwach liberalnych. Zasada proporcjonalności, Warszawa 2005, 
p. 209 et seq.
33 See the ECJ rulings in the cases: Criminal proceedings v. Messner, 265/88, p. 4209; Skanavi, 
193/94, p. 929. 
34 See also Article 53 § 1 of the Polish Criminal Code (hereinafter: PCC).
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these prohibitions) must be proportionate to the objective to be achieved. This approach 
to proportionality defines the relationship between the measures taken and the objec-
tives pursued, taking into account three essential elements, namely: the appropriateness, 
necessity and proportionality (sensu stricto) of the measures taken. Contrary to the prin-
ciple of proportionality in criminal law, in this case one can speak of potential propor-
tionality, since it concerns the relationship between certain measures and the objectives 
to be achieved in the future.35
Since the principle of potential proportionality – unlike the principle of retrospective 
proportionality – is updated not only with respect to the determination of the com-
mensurability of the offence, but also with regard to many other aspects, the question 
arises of whether - when analysing the compliance of sanctions provided for by EU law 
with the principle of proportionality - the principle of retrospective proportionality, the 
principle of potential proportionality or both principles should be applied together.36 
This problem also implies the existence of a relationship between both these principles.
An aspect that links these two concepts of proportionality seems to be a  correla-
tion with the issue of determining the adequacy of sanction severity. However, a cursory 
analysis suggests that both concepts refer to the issue of the proportionality of sanctions 
from two completely different perspectives. In accordance with the principle of potential 
proportionality, the sanction must be commensurate with the objective to be achieved. 
On the other hand, the implementation of the principle of proportionality in criminal 
law involves the imposition of a penalty proportional to the gravity of the offence already 
committed. 
The purposes behind the implementation of this principle are also fundamentally 
different. In administrative law, its implementation is primarily a matter of establishing 
the objective to be achieved by applying a specific measure. Then it must be determined 
whether the measure is appropriate, necessary and proportionate to that objective. On 
the other hand, in criminal law, this objective is primarily preventive, consisting in the 
elimination of certain types of behaviour that are considered forbidden under penalty. 
These arguments could therefore lead to the conclusion that there are no major points of 
contact between the two concepts.
In the literature, however, there are views indicating a certain link between these two 
principles in the context in question. Asp recognizes it in relation to two elements of the 
principle of proportionality in the administrative-legal sense. Firstly, it is a condition of 
the need for a measure in relation to the objective to be achieved through its application. 
According to Asp, in the fact that the adoption of the requisite necessity is determined 
35 See P. Asp, op. cit., p. 3; N. Jareborg, op. cit., pp. 529, 532.
36 An example of cumulative treatment of both principles by the ECJ is the judgement in Buitoni 
v. Fonds d’orientation et de régularisation des marchés agricoles (FORMA), 122/78, p. 2 et seq.
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by the assessment of the measure as the least intrusive and cumbersome, one can see 
a certain analogy to the criminal law concept of proportionality, which consists in assess-
ing the relationship between the seriousness of the offence committed and the severity 
of the penalty for committing it, based on the assessment of the degree of fault of the 
perpetrator and the degree of social harm of the offence.37 Asp notes a similar correlation 
in relation to the condition of proportionality in the strict sense (according to which the 
measure must be commensurate with the adverse effects or restrictions imposed), how-
ever, a fundamental difference is emphasized here, namely that the principle of potential 
proportionality concerns negative results that could arise in the future as a  result of 
illegal conduct, while the retrospective concept makes it possible to assess the propor-
tionality of the violation only in the context of an act that has already been committed.38 
Although the above arguments cannot be denied, this does not mean that both con-
cepts of proportionality have one cohesive element in the form of the commensurability 
of an adverse effect. It should be stressed that in both cases the compliance with the re-
quirement of proportionality in the strict sense is assessed from two completely different 
perspectives. Moreover, the principle of proportionality that is applicable in criminal law 
contains additional restrictions that affect the scope of its application.39 This primarily 
concerns the principle of the individualization of penalties and punitive measures, which 
consists in adapting them to the individual characteristics and personal circumstances 
of the perpetrator and the opportunities and prospects for preventive and educational 
influence on the offender. This principle also implies that the circumstances affecting the 
penalty are taken into account only in relation to the person to whom they apply (see 
Article 55 of the PCC). The severity of the penalty is therefore dependent not only on 
the adverse effects of committing a particular offence, but also on the degree of fault of 
the individual offender. 
The principle of proportionality  
and European criminal law
The next issue to be addressed is the definition of the extent to which the principle of 
proportionality affects the development of European criminal law, primarily with regard 
to the principle of retrospective proportionality. There is no doubt that the direct transfer 
of the interpretation of the principle, created on the basis of administrative law, to the 
area of criminal law is not possible. 
37 For more on the subject, see P. Asp, op. cit., p. 6 et seq.
38 Ibidem, p. 7 et seq.
39 For more details on this subject, see ibidem, p. 8 et seq.
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Based on the concept of retrospective proportionality, the starting point is, however, 
a distinction between two of its models.40 The first one, known as ordinal proportionality,41 
refers to the relative threat of penalty. Its essence is that the perpetrator who committed 
the crime is sentenced to a punishment commensurate with the degree of culpability and 
the gravity of the offence committed. However, it should be emphasized that, according 
to this concept, proportionality is assessed within a particular legal order. The relativity 
of punishment for a perpetrator means that the punishment must fall within the statu-
tory penalty envisaged for the type of offence which corresponds to a catalogue of penal 
sanctions applicable in a particular legal system and the rules for meting out penalties by 
a court. This model of proportionality is therefore intended to indicate that retrospective 
proportionality does not only serve to determine the limits of permissible punishment 
for a given type of crime in a particular criminal law system, but also determines the type 
and level of penalty imposed for an offence committed by a particular offender.
The second model of retrospective proportionality, known as cardinal proportionality,42 
concerns the correlation between the gravity of the act committed and the upper limit 
of the statutory penalty for its commitment. It therefore determines what maximum 
penalty will be commensurate with the type of offence. In practice, this approach to 
retrospective proportionality should be applied by national courts and the ECJ in de-
termining whether or not the penalty laid down in the EU regulations is commensurate 
with the gravity of the offence.
Article 49 § 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights  
and the principle of proportionality
Looking for the normative basis of the principle in question in regulations that are rel-
evant from the perspective of the regulation of European criminal law, attention should 
be paid to the aforementioned Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
states in § 3 “that the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal 
offence.” Referring the above to the observations made in the context of defining the 
semantic scope of the retrospective proportionality principle, one should consider to 
which of the presented models of the principle this regulation applies. 
Given the fact that the first of the discussed concepts of retrospective proportionality 
refers to the assessment of proportionality in the light of principles in a particular legal 
system, applying it on the ground of EU legislation, and therefore in a situation where 
40 See ibidem, p. 9 et seq.; A. von Hirsch, Past or future crimes: deservedness and dangerousness in the 
sentencing of criminals, Manchester 1985, p. 38 et seq. 
41 P. Asp, op. cit., p. 9.
42 Ibidem, p. 10; A. von Hirsch, op. cit., p. 43.
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there is no single coherent legal system, but rather the many legal systems of Member 
States which contain separate and often very different regulations, specifying a catalogue 
of penalties and rules for sentencing (and thus pursuing their separate national concept 
of ordinary proportionality), does not seem to be justified. This is further supported by 
the fact that EU law does not contain provisions defining a catalogue of penalties for 
criminal offences of a particular type that are uniformly applicable in all Member States 
and which could serve as a benchmark in the examination of compliance with the prin-
ciple. Certain secondary legislation acts (i.e. essentially directives, and in the pre-Lisbon 
legal framework, also the third-pillar framework decisions) contain provisions setting 
a minimum level for maximum penalties for committing crimes that exhaust strictly de-
fined constitutive elements, however, this “solely” means that Member States are obliged 
to incorporate into their national legal systems a minimum standard laid down in Eu-
ropean regulations. However, this minimum standard covers not only the obligation to 
combat certain pathologies by means of criminal law instruments, but also the need to 
take into account in the national legislation a certain minimum threshold of the upper 
limit of penalty43. It must be noted, however, that these EU minimum standards often 
do not coincide with what was previously envisaged in the national penal provisions of 
individual states. In such situations, these states are obliged to take these standards into 
account and adapt their legal regulations to them.44 This harmonisation of criminal law 
does not mean, however, that in this way a coherent catalogue of penalties and a system 
of sentencing will be established that will apply in all the Member States. 
The arguments presented thus prove that the provision of Article 49 § 3 ChFR EU 
does not refer to the first model of retrospective proportionality. It should therefore be 
assumed that it is linked to the cardinal proportionality model. And that means, in turn, 
that the role of this regulation is solely to set criteria for determining what the maximum 
penalty must be for committing an offence of a particular type, so that the severity of 
that penalty is commensurate with the gravity of the act committed. This circumstance 
entails that the regulation in question for European criminal law is of relatively small 
43 See e.g. Article 2 of the Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA of 26 July 2001 on mon-
ey laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities 
and proceeds of crime (Official Journal L 182/1 of 5 July 2001); Article 5 § 3 of the Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (Official Journal 
L 164/3 of 22 June 2002); Article 4 § 2 of the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 
22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (Official Journal L 192/54 of 31 July 
2003); Article 4 §§ 1–4 of the Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 Oct. 2004 
laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in 
the field of drug trafficking (Official Journal L 335/8 of 11 November 2004).
44 See also U. Scheffler, Standardy minimalne Rady Europy versus standardy minimalne Rady Unii 
Europejskiej, in Europeizacja prawa karnego w Polsce i w Niemczech – podstawy konstytucyjno-
prawne, ed. A.J. Szwarc, J.C. Joerden, Poznań 2007, p. 106.
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significance,45 and the retrospective proportionality principle, laid down in Article 49 
§ § 3 ChFR EU, sets only a general framework for the actions of the EU legislator in 
the area of criminal law.46 Nevertheless, it should be noted that, due to the ChFR EU 
status,47 individuals can rely on it directly if they consider that punishment imposed on 
them is disproportionately severe to the act they committed.
EU regulations governing police and judicial cooperation  
in criminal matters and the principle of proportionality
More attention should be paid to the analysis of legislative actions taken under one 
 of the EU’s policies, i.e. police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which has 
been ‘communitarised’ under the Treaty of Lisbon. However, before the EU’s three pillar 
structure was abolished, the European Union (since the Treaty of Amsterdam entered 
into force) increasingly often set, by means of secondary legislation instruments (for-
merly in particular framework decisions and currently directives), specific requirements 
(known as minimum standards) for Member States, concerning the constituent ele-
ments of criminal offences and penalties for their commitment [see ex Article 31(1)(e) 
TEU; de lege lata Article 83 § 1 TFEU].48 The justification for such a state of affairs can 
be seen in the (disputed) assumption that combating cross-border crime also requires 
a cross-border response.49 In the context of European criminal law, the principle of pro-
45 The doctrine also suggests that the principle of proportionality should be interpreted strictly in line 
 with Article 49 of the ChFR EU, i.e. only in the context of those minimum maximum pen-
alties provided for by EU law, and thus make these minimum standards an element of the 
classification of the different types of offences subject to harmonization; or to interpret it as 
a principle functioning only in relation to establishing the relationship of EU law with the rules 
laid down by the national law of a particular Member State. This limited understanding of this 
regulation does not, however, deserve recognition; critically also see P. Asp, op. cit., p. 11 et seq.
46 It should however be noted that some representatives of the doctrine advocate the application 
in this area of the concept of potential proportionality which mainly functions in administra-
tive law; see. e.g. P. Asp, op. cit., p. 12 et seq.
47 Let us recall that the Treaty of Lisbon did not incorporate the provisions of the ChFR EU as 
one of its parts, although under Article 6 of the new TEU – taking into account its objections – 
the ChFR EU has the same legal force as the Treaties, which means - with the entry into force 
of the LT – the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights will be the primary law of 
the Union. Cf. J. Barcz, Przewodnik po Traktacie z Lizbony. Traktaty stanowiące Unię Europejską, 
Warszawa 2008, p. 59 et seq.; A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, Zasada proporcjonalności..., op. cit., p. 90 
et seq.
48 See also U. Scheffler, op. cit., p. 104 et seq.
49 As a  counter argument, it could be pointed out that the approximation (harmonisation) of 
Member States’ criminal laws as part of judicial cooperation in criminal matters constitutes 
a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the criminal law systems of individual states, 
traditionally recognized as the bastions of national sovereignty. Critically, see also J. Piskor-
ski, Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Gemeinschaftsrecht als Voraussetzung für die Kriminalisierung, in 
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portionality should, therefore, be referred not only to the issue of determining the scope 
of the European Union’s legislative powers, but also to the scope of permissible crimi-
nalisation and penalisation and, above all, the admissible limits of criminal sanctions. In 
the acts of EU secondary legislation there is a repeatedly expressed requirement50 that 
penalties for committing specific crimes should be dissuasive, effective and commensu-
rate.51 It would seem that such an approach to the condition of the proportionality of 
penalties implies the prohibition of excessive interference with individual rights, and can 
therefore be interpreted as an emanation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In 
the doctrine (mainly German), however, there are many different views.52 In this context, 
it is worth noting in particular the study by Gröblinghoff, who attempted to make a clear 
distinction between these concepts by assuming that “deterrence” should be understood 
as potential offenders refraining from infringement due to fear of punishment (negative 
Vergleichende Strafrechtswissenschaft. Festschrift für Andrzej J. Szwarc zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. 
J.C. Joerden, U. Scheffler, A. Sinn, G. Wolf, Berlin 2009, p. 75 and references therein. 
50 See e.g. Article 6 § 1 of the Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on 
greater security by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection 
with the introduction of the Euro (Official Journal L 329/3 of 4 December 2001); Article 5 § 
1 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism 
(Official Journal L 164/3 of 22 June 2002); Article 5 § 1 of the Council Framework Decision 
2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on protection of the environment through criminal law (Of-
ficial Journal L 29/55 of 5 February 2003); Article 4 § 1 of the Council Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (Official Journal 
L 192/54 of 31 July 2003); Article 58 § 1 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council 2015/849 of 5 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (Official Journal of the European Union 
of 5 June 2015, L 141, p. 73 et seq.).
51 The concept of requirements, however, was created by the Council, which had already applied 
them in joint actions which were the predecessors of the framework decisions under the Maas-
tricht Treaty (see e.g. Title II, Section B, point B, Joint Action 97/154 / JHA of 24 February 
1997 on combating trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children, Official 
Journal L 63/2 of 4 March 1997]; Article 2 § 1 and Article 3 of the Joint Action 98/733/JHA 
of 21 December 1998 on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation 
in the Member States of the European Union (Official Journal L 351/1 of 29 December 1998), 
but derive from ECJ jurisprudence, where it first appeared in the judgement on “Greek maize”: 
Komisja v. Grecja, 68/88, p. 2965. They can also be found in Article 2 § 2 of the Convention of 
26 July 1995 on the protection of the financial interests of the European Communities (Of-
ficial Journal C 316/49 of 27 November 1995). See also T. Weigend, Mindestanforderungen an 
ein europaweit geltendes harmonisiertes Strafrecht, in Strafrecht und Kriminalität in Europa, ed. F. 
Zieschang, E. Hilgendorf, K. Laubenthal, Baden-Baden 2003, p. 59; K. Tiedemann, Gegenwart 
und Zukunft des Europäischen Strafrechts, ZStW 2004, no. 116, p. 953.
52 See, e.g., T. Weigend, op. cit., p. 79: “Within the meaning of the ECJ jurisdiction, the sub-
stantive distinction between the three prerequisites, ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ is 
almost impossible.” And also S. Gröblinghoff, Die Verpflichtungen des deutschen Strafgesetzgebers 
zum Schutze der Interessen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Heidelberg 1996, p. 37: “each of 
these constituent elements is undefined.”
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general prevention); effectiveness means that the sanction must be adequate to stop the 
individual from further infringements (individual prevention), and to deter the general 
public, by introducing commensurate sanctioning standards and their adequate applica-
tion, to voluntarily adhere to these standards (positive general prevention); and finally, 
proportionality covers the gravity of the infringement.53 Satzger is also of a similar opin-
ion, treating effectiveness and deterrence as a homogeneous criterion and assuming that 
proportionality refers to at least the necessary threat of punishment imposed in connec-
tion with committing an offence.54 
The conclusion should therefore be that the criterion of proportionality, as it appears 
in the regulations of the EU secondary legislation, does not serve to set a minimum level 
of maximum criminal penalty permissible under a national legal system, but rather to 
prohibit disregard for violation of EU regulations by imposing disproportionately low 
sanctions. It may, therefore, be accepted that it is rather intended to establish “minimum 
sanctions” aimed at excluding ineffective and non-dissuasive penalties.55 
In conclusion, it should be noted, however, that the assessment of the appropriateness 
of adopting EU minimum rules for criminal sanctions in the light of compliance with 
the principle of proportionality seems to be important. Much more problematic is the 
presentation of convincing arguments, advocating the need for uniform EU-wide meas-
ures, where each Member State has its own national catalogue of criminal sanctioning, 
a system of penalties and anti-crime instruments. It seems that, in the light of the re-
quirement to comply with the principle of proportionality, it would be easier to establish 
a catalogue of prohibited acts that would be subject to joint combat in the EU area, as 
well as penalties for committing them, than to harmonise the criminal law institutions 
existing in the Member States. 
Conclusions
As a summary of these considerations, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, the 
application of the principle of proportionality in the law of the European Union is hori-
zontal, i.e. at all levels of legislation and, in practice, it permeates the EU legal system.56 
In this context, the principle of proportionality is primarily a  judicial control instru-
ment – the role of the ECJ is dominant here, although the role of national courts can-
not be overlooked. This control is performed not only in relation to legislative actions 
taken by the EU institutions, but also in relation to different kinds of measures that are 
imposed on the basis of the regulations of EU law, including sanctions. This is because 
53 S. Gröblinghoff, op. cit., p. 25 et seq.
54 H. Satzger, Die Europäisierung des Strafrechts, Köln 2001, pp. 368, 372.
55 See also U. Scheffler, op. cit., p. 109; T. Weigend, op. cit., p. 79.
56 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Stosowanie..., op. cit., p. 16 and references therein.
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the Court of Justice is of the opinion that the penalty should be proportionate to the 
infringement.57 By applying the control mechanism described above, the individual in-
terest is related in this case to the sanction imposed, whereas the public interest (EU) 
is related to the guarantee of the application of European Union law. In this case, the 
ECJ will investigate whether the sanction is proportionate - i.e. whether it contributes 
to the achievement of the Treaty objective and whether the entity on which it has been 
imposed does not suffer undue burdens.58 As regards the determination of compliance 
with the principle of proportionality of the sanctions imposed by the EU institutions or 
by Member States for infringing EU law, the criterion of proportionality is applied in 
the strict sense. So there is a kind of “balancing of interests,” i.e. the effect of deterring 
from acting compared to the cost of punishing the perpetrator.59
On the other hand, the application of the principle of proportionality in the area of 
European criminal law requires above all an answer to the question of the legitimacy 
of extending the powers of the EU to the field of criminal law and the potential scope 
of permissible intervention of the EU legislator in the freedom and rights of the indi-
vidual. As shown above, this principle is developing in two ways: in the ECJ case law 
and in EU secondary legislation, and its subject is a mechanism for the determination 
of penalties, the severity of which must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. 
Bearing in mind that not all Member States formulate their national system of penal-
ties and the rules of sentencing based on the principle of proportionality, and that the 
national criminal law regimes of the Member States may differ significantly in terms of 
the degree of repression, instruments of EU law defining a minimum standard somehow 
automatically impose an obligation on states with less repressive punishment to adapt 
their laws to those of more repressive states. In my opinion, this circumstance stems from 
the unreasonable assumption that the differences between Member States regarding the 
degree of repression of domestic criminal law systems constitute a problem that can only 
be solved by adopting harmonising measures consisting in setting a minimum standard 
at the level foreseen in states with more repressive law. The assumption that increased re-
pression of criminal law provisions contributes to the effectiveness of combating crime is 
highly controversial. Even among the Member States of the European Union with high 
crime-fighting statistics, it is possible to distinguish those whose criminal law is rather 
repressive from those whose criminal law is more liberal. It is not an easy task to deter-
57 See the ECJ judgement in Atalanta Amsterdam BV v. Produktschap voor Vee Ne Vlees, 240/78, 
p. 2137.
58 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Sądowe..., op. cit., p. 12; eadem, Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie 
Wspólnot Europejskich – kryteria..., op. cit., p. 265 et seq.; eadem, Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie 
Wspólnot Europejskich, op. cit., p. 96 et seq.
59 For more details on this subject: J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Sądowe..., op. cit., p. 12; eadem, 
Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich – kryteria..., op. cit., p. 264 et seq.; eadem, 
Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich, op. cit., p. 95 et seq.
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mine the correct correlation between the degree of repression of criminal law and actions 
taken on its basis that are intended to effectively prevent and combat specific patholo-
gies.60 The same difficulties arise in the process of establishing a minimum framework 
for the threat of punishment for committing a crime of a particular type. For this reason, 
the legitimacy of the EU legislator setting increasingly repressive minimum standards 
that specify a maximum penalty for committing a particular crime seems to raise reason-
able doubts. Especially since the analysis of European legislation that provides for such 
standards often leads to the conclusion that the principle of proportionality has not been 
taken into account in the process of its creation.
Literature
Asp P., Two notions of Proportionality, in Materials from the 22nd IVR Word Congress, www.
crimpol.eu/?p=200 [access: 12.02.2017].
Barcz J., Przewodnik po Traktacie z Lizbony. Traktaty stanowiące Unię Europejską, War-
szawa 2008.
Emiliou N., The Principle of Proportionality in European Law, London – The Hague –
Boston 1996.
Frąckowiak-Adamska A., Podwójne zasady badania proporcjonalności przez Trybunał 
Sprawiedliwości, in Zasady ogólne prawa wspólnotowego, ed. C. Mik, Toruń 2007.
Frąckowiak-Adamska A., Zasada proporcjonalności jako gwarancja swobód rynku we- 
wnętrznego Wspólnoty Europejskiej, Warszawa 2009.
Gröblinghoff S., Die Verpflichtungen des deutschen Strafgesetzgebers zum Schutze der Inter-
essen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Heidelberg 1996.
Hirsch A. von, Past or future crimes: deservedness and dangerousness in the sentencing of 
criminals, Manchester 1985.
Jareborg N., Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), “Ohio State Journal of Crim-
inal Law” 2004, no. 2.
Królikowski M., Sprawiedliwość karania w  społeczeństwach liberalnych: zasada propor- 
cjonalności, Warszawa 2005.
Maliszewska-Nienartowicz J., Rozwój zasady proporcjonalności w  europejskim prawie 
wspólnotowym, “Studia Europejskie” 2006, no. 1.
Maliszewska-Nienartowicz J., Sądowe stosowanie zasady proporcjonalności, “Europejski 
Przegląd Sądowy” 2009, no. 1.
Maliszewska-Nienartowicz J., Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich, 
Toruń 2007.
60 Cf. P. Asp, op. cit., p. 13.
The Principle of Proportionality... | 299 
Maliszewska-Nienartowicz J., Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich – 
kryteria i zakres kontroli dokonywanej przez Trybunał Sprawiedliwości, in Zasady ogólne 
prawa wspólnotowego, ed. C. Mik, Toruń 2007.
Milczarek D., Subsydiarność – próba bilansu, in Subsydiarność, ed. D. Milczarek, Warszawa 
1998.
Piskorski J., Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Gemeinschaftsrecht als Vorraussetzung für die Krimi-
nalisierung, in Vergleichende Strafrechtswissenschaft. Frankfurter Festschrift für Andrzej 
J. Szwarc zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. J.C. Joerden, U. Scheffler, A. Sinn, G. Wolf, Berlin 
2009.
Piskorski J., Legitymizacja prawa karnego Unii Europejskiej, Poznań 2013.
Rivers J., Proportionality and discretion in international and European law, in Transna-
tional Constitutionalism. International and European Models, ed. N. Tsagourias, Cam-
bridge 2009.
Satzger H., Die Europäisierung des Strafrechts, Köln 2001.
Scheffler U., Standardy minimalne Rady Europy versus standardy minimalne Rady Unii 
Europejskiej, in Europeizacja prawa karnego w Polsce i w Niemczech – podstawy konsty-
tucyjnoprawne, ed. A.J. Szwarc, J.C. Joerden, Poznań 2007.
Szpringer W., Subsydiarność jako zasada ustrojowa w państwie federalnym – członku Unii 
Europejskiej (na przykładzie RFN), in Subsydiarność, ed. D. Milczarek, Warszawa 1998.
Szwarc-Kuczer M., Kompetencje Unii Europejskiej w dziedzinie harmonizacji prawa kar-
nego materialnego, Warszawa 2011.
Tiedemann K., Gegenwart und Zukunft des Europäischen Strafrechts, ZStW 2004, no. 116.
Weigend T., Mindestanforderungen an ein europaweit geltendes harmonisiertes Strafrecht, in 
Strafrecht und Kriminalität in Europa, ed. F. Zieschang, E. Hilgendorf, K. Laubenthal, 
Baden-Baden 2003.
Witkowska M., Zasady funkcjonowania Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2008.
Wyrozumska A., Państwa członkowskie a Unia Europejska, in Prawo Unii Europejskiej. 
Zagadnienia systemowe. Prawo materialne i polityki, ed. J. Barcz, Warszawa 2006.
summary
The Principle of Proportionality in European Union Law  
as a Prerequisite for Penalization
The paper analysis the principle of proportionality, which is widely applied in the EU 
legal order and is therefore one of the fundamental principles of the system of the Eu-
ropean Union. It is one of the legal principles that govern decision-making processes 
and common strategic objectives, and which are applicable when establishing European 
Union legislation and transposing it into national law, including in the area of criminal 
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law, although the current analyses do not often focus on discussing this aspect. Due to 
its complexity and significance for the processes of establishing and applying the law, the 
principle of proportionality requires detailed and separate discussion, especially in the 
context of European criminal law.
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